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Although state bills of rights have long existed as written guar-
antees against encroachments on individual freedom, little heed has
been paid to these sections of state constitutions which secure basic lib-
erties to citizens of the individual states.1 A growing concern for in-
dividual rights, a more conservative United States Supreme Court, and
less passive state courts, however, have focused -attention on these
documents in recent years.2
In 1972, for example, the California Supreme Court invalidated
the death penalty in People v. Anderson,3 relying primarily on the state
constitutional prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment. 4  Anticipat-
ing a possible contrary decision 'by -the United States Supreme Court
based on the Eighth Amendment, 5 the California court was careful to
stress the language 'and unique history of the state Declaration of
Rights' as constitutional authority for its decision.7 Thus, partly be-
1. See Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State Constitution, 1966 UTAH L.
REV. 326, 348 [hereinafter cited as Mazor]; Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts
and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAND. L. REv. 620, 642 (1951).
2. See, e.g., Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASH. L. REv. 454
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Countryman]; Falk, Foreword: The State Constitution: A
More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CAW. L. REv. 273 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Falk]; Force, State "Bills of Rights": A Case of Neglect and the Need for a
Renaissance, 3 VALPARiIso U.L. REV. 125 (1969); Graves, State Constitutional Law, 8
Wm. & MARY L. Rnv. 1 (1966); Linde, Without "Due Process", Unconstitutional Law
in Oregon, 49 ORE. L. REv. 125 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Linde]; Mosk, The Con-
stitution of California in the Era of the Burger Court and States' Rights, Los Angeles
Daily Journal, Dec. 19, 1973, Report Section, at 26-29; Note, Project Report: Toward
an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARv. Civ. RIGHTs-CIV. LiB. L. REv. 271
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Project Report]; Note, Freedom of Expression Under State
Constitutions, 20 STAN. L. REv. 318 (1968); Linde, Book Review, 52 ORE. L. REV. 325
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Linde, Book Review].
3. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958
(1972).
4. See CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § 6, which prohibits cruel or unusual punishment.
The Anderson court found the death penalty to be both cruel and unusual, even though
a finding of either would have provided a sufficient basis for the decision. People v.
Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 639, 493 P.2d 880, 887, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 159 (1972).
5. Barrett, Anderson and the Judicial Function, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 739, 748
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Barrett]. But see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
6. CAL. CONsT. art. I.
7. The action of the California Supreme Court in People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d
[4811
cause of this textual difference between the federal and state provisions,
California citizens were granted a higher degree of protection than
existed at that time under the prevailing interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.8
The ability of state courts to formulate stricter standards than those
required by the United States Supreme Court is beyond question;9 the
federal Bill of Rights as ,applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees a minimum of protection which a state court
628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972), was not the first instance of its providing
expanded protection for individual rights beyond that required by federal guarantees
which have been applied to the states, nor was it the first time a provision of the Cal-
ifornia Constitution was relied upon exclusively, despite the presence of a similar and
applicable federal provision. See, e.g., People v. Clark, 62 Cal. 2d 870, 402 P.2d 856,
44 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1965); Falk, supra note 2, at 277-79; Linde, Book Review, supra
note 2, at 336-37. Anderson is the most important of these decisions, especially in sug-
gesting the manner in which a state bill of rights provision could be differentiated from
an analogous federal one. See also Linde, supra note 2, suggesting that it is improper
for state courts to rely on the federal Constitution when state constitutions contain sim-
ilar provisions, as there is no final state action until the state court has applied state
law to the case. As the Fourteenth Amendment does not come into play unless state
action is found, the provisions of the federal Bill of Rights should not be utilized until
state law has been applied. Beyond the logic of federalism which compels such a con-
clusion, the argument is more cogent if the state provision is in fact different from the
federal provision, either textually or as it has been construed.
8. A substantial portion of the literature dealing with the Anderson decision dis-
cussed not the merits of the death penalty, but rather the manner in which the case was
decided. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 5; Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State
Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 750 (1972); Falk, supra note 2; Wright, The Role of the
Judiciary: From Marbury to Anderson, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1262 (1972).
9. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972); Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (dictum); Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 338, 521 P.2d 460,
465, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468, 473 (1974) (Mosk, J., dissenting); Curry v. Superior Court,
2 Cal. 3d 707, 716, 470 P.2d 345, 350-51, 87 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366-67 (1970). See also
CALIFORNIA CONsTITUTIoN REVISION COMMISSION, PROPOSED REVISION OF THE CALIFOR-
NIA CONSTITUTION, pt. 5, § 3, at 17 [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED REVISION]: "The
State of California is an inseparable part of the United States of America, and the
United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Rights guaranteed by the
California Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States
Constitution."
The Constitution Revision Commission has submitted a revision of various articles
of the constitution, including article I. The work was completed in 1971 and submitted
to the legislature, but has only recently been placed on the ballot for approval by the
electorate. Proposed Amendments to Constitution, Propositions and Proposed Laws,
General Election, Tuesday Nov. 5, 1974, at 27 (ballot pamphlet). This revision of the
constitution is intended to be a housekeeping matter although there are revisions of
possible significance. Reference will be made both to the commission's work and the
ballot proposal, which differ in some respects. The former provides some analysis of
the provisions in both the background material used in formulating the revisions and the
comments to the proposed changes. The latter is more important, especially as it may
change the substance of some provisions.
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cannot abridge, regardless of an independent construction of the state
constitution.' 0 State courts, and particularly the California Supreme
Court, have been innovative in the past; but only rarely has a state bill
of rights provision been construed to require a 'higher standard of pro-
tection than its federal counterpart."
A brief examination of the California Declaration of Rights, the
first article of the California Constitution, reveals substantial textual dif-
ference between it and the first eight amendments to the United States
Constitution. The question of how much deference should be ac-
corded to variations in constitutional texts has been posited by one com-
mentator in this manner:
Do the differences among the several eighteenth century constitu-
tional texts and the state constitutions that followed them imply
possible differences of doctrine concerning the significance, scope,
and emphasis accorded various claims of right? Or does the homo-
geneity of the nation's shared traditions and experiences imply that
such differences are only accidents of draftsmanship in the parallel
expression of a common vision of American liberty?12
As this excerpt implies, commentators both prior and subsequent to the
Anderson decision have suggested that these differences in constitu-
tional -texts, and the historical circumstances in which these texts were
drafted, can serve as bases for broader interpretations of state bills of
rights.13 The question, then, is whether an analysis of the text and his-
tory of the provisions of a particular state bill of rights will lead a court
to require more individual protection under the state constitution than
is provided under the current interpretation of the United States Consti-
tution.
This note will supply a partial answer to this question as it relates
to the California Constitution. Although decisions have stressed the
need for an historical inquiry into the framers' intent in enacting certain
provisions, there has been no discussion of what sources can be used
to ascertain the intentions of the delegates to the constitutional conven-
tions. Thus an initial consideration of these sources is necessary. 14
10. See Force, State "Bills of Rights": A Case of Neglect and the Need for a
Renaissance, 3 VALPARAISO U.L. Rav. 125, 129 (1969); Project Report, supra note 2,
at 284; cf. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).
11. It is necessary to distinguish two situations. In the first, a state court, rely-
ing on the United States Constitution and United States Supreme Court precedents, de-
cides a question not yet passed on by the federal court, but anticipating the latter court's
decision. See, e.g., Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948). In the second,
a state court accords greater protection under its own bill of rights than under the fed-
eral document. See, e.g., Cardenas v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 273, 363 P.2d 889,
14 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1961).
12. Linde, Book Review, supra note 2, at 333.
13. Falk, supra note 2, at 283; Linde, supra note 2; Project Report, supra note
2, at 315-19.
14. See text accompanying notes 21-67 infra.
This inquiry will be followed by an application of a textual analysis and
historical investigation of selected provisions of the California Declara-
tion of Rights, in an attempt to test the general validity and utility of
such an analysis. As will be seen, not every provision lends itself to
such a constructive technique.
Some provisions, such as the state freedom of speech section, are
susceptible to a textual analysis which provides a ground for greater
protection than the analogous federal provision, and for which there
exists no relevant historical data to support (or refute) such a construc-
tion.15  Others, such as those concerning the protection against double
jeopardy'" or the prohibition against unreasonable seizures and search-
es, 1 7 are substantially similar or identical to their federal counterparts.
In the absence of historical evidence to the contrary, no apparent basis
for a differing construction exists.
The right to privacy is a relatively new constitutional provision for
which there is no federal equivalent expressly stated in the Bill of
Rights; thus, the text and history of that provision provide a ready basis
for broader rights under the California Declaration of Rights.'" Fi-
nally, certain provisions, such as the California equal protection clauses,
present radically different texts, and, more importantly, were formu-
lated under a different set of historical circumstances, than their federal
counterparts. These factors point toward state court construction of the
state bill of rights in a manner not tied to federal interpretation of an-
alogous provisions of the United States Constitution.' 9
The provisions discussed below are not, of course, totally repre-
sentative of the protections embodied in the California Declaration of
Rights. They do serve, however, to illustrate the conditions under
which a textual and historical differentiation is appropriate and to dem-
onstrate the extent to which the California courts have utilized the Dec-
laration of Rights.2"
15. See text accompanying notes 68-97 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 98-114 infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 115-41 infra.
18. See text accompanying notes 128-41 infra.
19. See text accompanying notes 142-70 infra.
20. It must be emphasized at the outset that this type of analysis is of limited util-
ity. The text of a constitutional provision is only one factor in its application to a par-
ticular case. See generally tenBroek, Admissibility and Use by the United States Su-
preme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction (pts. 1-5), 26 CALIF. L.
REV. 287, 437, 664 (1938), 27 CALIF. L. REV. 157, 399 (1939). An historical inquiry
into the framers' intent is also useful, especially when used to illustrate that a state pro-
vision, different on its face from an analogous federal provision, was intended to be so.
Such an inquiry is a traditional rule of constitutional construction, long considered the
paramount method by which meaning was given to a constitution. 1 T. COOLEY, CON-
STITUTIONAL LiMITATIONS 124-29 (8th ed. W. Carrington 1927). However it is now
well recognized that the intentions of draftsmen centuries ago cannot solely determine
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Historical Sources
Disregarding various amendments and revisions, the present Cali-
fornia Constitution is almost one hundred years old.s" Most of the pro-
visions of the Declaration of Rights were incorporated from the consti-
tution of 1849, the first organic law of California after it became a ter-
ritory of the United States.22 Although the longstanding existence of
the state Declaration of Rights should provide 125 years of precedent
in construction and consideration of its provisions, this document has
usually been ignored. 23  When mentioned in modem cases, it has of-
the course of law today. The question of how the interpretation of the Constitution
must change still remains a subject for debate. Compare Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 202-03 (1970) (Harlan, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part), with Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103-04 (1958) (opinion of Warren, C.J.), and People v. Ander-
son, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 647-48, 493 P.2d 880, 893, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 165 (1972).
Other factors can be more compelling than the text or history of a provision in the
resolution of how the provision is applied. The willingness of the court to extend a par-
ticular provision beyond its current interpretation is in itself a complex subject which
transcends legal analysis, although it is the most important factor. See Barrett, supra
note 5, for a discussion of some of the nonlegal considerations of People v. Anderson.
The fact situation in which a case arises, the general social and political climate in
which the court sits, previous decisions on the point, and sister state precedents are addi-
tional, and not exclusive, concerns which will determine issues of a constitutional nature.
See tenBroek, supra; cf. Murphy, The Constitution: Interpretation and Intent, 45
A.B.A.J. 592, 594 (1959).
21. The present constitution was approved by the voters of California in May
1879. See generally Palmer & Selvin, The Development of Law in California, WEST'S
CALnFORNA CODES, Constitution 1, 13-18 (West 1954) [hereinafter cited as Palmer &
Selvin].
22. Id.
23. Older cases, decided prior to the application of the federal Bill of Rights to
the states, did rely on the California Constitution. See, e.g., Dailey v. Superior Court,
112 Cal. 94, 44 P. 458 (1896); People v. Webb, 38 Cal. 467 (1869). However the
influence of the United States Supreme Court was such that its construction of the fed-
eral Constitution had great weight when state courts construed similar state law. When
the Court began to take cognizance that the Bill of Rights existed, state courts usually
looked to it for interpretation of both state and federal guarantees of individual rights.
Mazor, supra note 1, at 348-49; see Countryman, supra note 2, at 455.
Federal preemption of the civil liberties field became so pervasive that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court declared in 1938 that "cogent reasons must exist before a state court
in construing a provision of the state Constitution will depart from the construction
placed by the Supreme Court of the United States on a similar provision in the federal
Constitution." Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 12 Cal. 2d 85, 89, 82 P.2d 391, 393 (1938),
appeal dismissed, 306 U.S. 621 (1939). But see text accompanying notes 85-89 infra.
This kind of dictum is by no means isolated to California. Paulsen, State Constitu-
tions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 V.An. L. Rnv. 620, 621-22
(1951).
Recent California cases have been inconsistent in their variation from formulations
of the United States Supreme Court. Falk, supra note 2, at 277-78; see Linde, Book
Review, supra note 2, at 336. That there is a method behind these inconsistencies is
suggested by Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 750
ten been relegated to a footnote or cited without discussion, while an
analogous federal provision was found to be the controlling law.24
Thus, while the Declaration of Rights is attaining greater prominence,
there is a lack of analysis of many of its provisions..2 5  Case law, com-
mentary, and analogies to federal sources, however, do suggest possible
aids in the interpretation of the California Constitution. 26
Debates and Proceedings
California has been subject to two state constitutions since its ad-
mission to the Union in 1850. The first, a rather hastily assembled
document, was enacted in 1849. The present constitution, a subject
of a bitter partisan battle, was narrowly accepted at the polls in 1879.27
As the present constitution adopted many of its provisions from the orig-
inal constitution,28 the debates and proceedings of both constitutional
conventions provide the most direct and valuable source for ascertain-
ing the framers' intent. 29  Although a definite sense of what was in-
tended by the framers in various sections of the constitution is not al-
ways available, their activities on the floor of both conventions have
been faithfully reported. Unfortunately, however, much of the work
at the conventions was completed in unreported committee sessions; 30
(1972), who asserts that the California Supreme Court is trying to insulate its decisions
from constitutional review. When the state constitution is relied on, the United States
Supreme Court is prevented by the adequate state ground rule from reviewing the case,
and when federal grounds are relied on, a state constitutional amendment, such as that
restoring the death penalty in California after the Anderson decision, which overturns
the construction of the state constitution, is rendered ineffective. But cf. Falk, supra
note 2, at 281-84, stating that, whatever the motivation a state court may have not to
follow a holding of the Supreme Court, the doctrine of federalism allows such a decision.
That the choice of judicial tactics should not determine which constitution is used, but
rather that a state constitution should always be relied on by a state court, is Professor
Linde's argument. Linde, supra note 2. See note 7 supra.
24. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 596 n.ll, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249 n.11,
96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609 n.11 (1971); Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644,
298 P.2d 1, appeal dismissed sub nom., Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921
(1956) (Cal. Declaration of Rights not mentioned).
25. But see PROPOSED REvISIONS, supra note 9, pt. 5, at 15-34.
26. Although this note deals with article I of the constitution, the Declaration of
Rights, the present discussion pertains more generally to the constitution as a whole.
27. See text accompanying notes 59-65 infra.
28. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
29. See J. BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA
ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION, 1849 (1850) [hereinafter cited as
1849 DEBATES]; 1 E. WILLIS & P. STOCKTON, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, CONVENED AT THE CITY OF
SACRAMENTO, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1878 (1880) [hereinafter cited as 1879 DE-
BATES].
30. See 1849 DEBATES, supra note 29, at 30-31; 1879 DEBATES, supra note 29, at
178-79,
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thus, the available records are not entirely satisfactory. Nonetheless,
they do provide indications of what the framers desired to express in
certain provisions.
Ballot Pamphlets
In addition to the problem of interpreting the original provisions
of the California Constitution, attention must also be given to the con-
struction of subsequent changes in those provisions. Since its -approval
by the voters in 1879, 'the constitution has been amended many times.
Whether the amendment resulted from legislative action or citizen in-
itiative, the proposers' intent in submitting the amendment to the voters
can be readily learned. In addition to -any reference in 'the legislative
journals to 'the history of the amendment,81 ballot pamphlets issued by
the secretary of state to inform voters of the proposed amendment con-
tain authoritative statements by the attorney general or legislative an-
alyst concerning the purpose of the amendment.3" Although such
statements are abbreviated, they are relied upon 'by the voters in mak-
ing their decisions and do represent -the official government statement
of the meaning of the proposal.33
Histories and Newspaper Accounts of the
Constitutional Conventions
Another source of relevant information, 'and one utilized by the
court in People v. Anderson, 4 is histories and accounts of California
at the time of the conventions. Although these have the disadvantage
of being general and superficial, and thus not of much use on any par-
ticular point, they are valuable in providing a context in which to under-
stand the concerns of the delegates to the conventions. In addition to
two extensive histories of this state,35 there are numerous, though often
repetitive, specialized accounts of 'the conventions which provide
greater detail.36
31. See, e.g., Carter v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 582, 203 P.2d 758, 769
(1949).
32. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3566-67 (West Supp. 1974); see, e.g., CALIFORNIA SEC-
RETARY OF STATE, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION, PROPOSITIONS AND PRO-
POSED LAws (General Election, Nov. 7, 1972) (voter pamphlet). See also Carter v.
Seaboard Fin. Co., 33 Cal. 2d 564, 581, 203 P.2d 758, 769 (1949).
33. Occasion to utilize these statements is, of course, limited to cases where an
amended provision is being construed, but in those cases, such statements are as valuable
as the debates and proceedings of the original conventions. If the proposed revision of
the Declaration of Rights succeeds at the polls, the opportunity to utilize this kind of
source will be greatly increased.
34. 6 Cal. 3d 628, 636-37 n.17, 493 P.2d 880, 885 n.17, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 157
n.17 (1972).
35. 1-7 H. BAxcROFr, HISTORY OF CALnYoRNru (1884-86, 1888, 1890); 1-4 T.
HrrEL, HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA (1897-98).
36. See, e.g., C. GooDwiN, THE ESTABLISHmENT OF STATE GOVERNMENT IN CALi-
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In construction of the United States Constitution, The Federalist
has been an invaluable aid to both courts and scholars. In California
constitutional literature, there exists no work comparable to these pap-
ers, either in quality or conception. Nevertheless, written commentary
contemporaneous with the conventions does exist. The ratification of
-the 1879 constitution was hotly contested317 and provoked much discus-
sion in newspaper accounts and editorials.3 8  The value of many of the
reports and analyses presented in -these journals is questionable, since
a newspaper's motive in discussing an issue frequently was not to place
before the voters an impartial account of the provisions and what the
delegates intended them to mean, but rather to influence directly the
success of the document at the polls. 9  While it is not contended that
the level of journalism in California in 1879 approached the sophistica-
tion of The Federalist, the latter documents were themselves "com-
posed as an argument on one side of a bitterly controverted question."'"
Partisanship is no indication of merit, but as commentary on the disputes
over the issues at the conventions, contemporary newspaper accounts
are at least one potential source of constructional aid.
Judicial Opinions
Another source occasionally used by the United States Supreme
Court in interpreting the United States Constitution is statements made
in later years by former delegates to the constitutional convention while
serving as justices or legislators.41 Such an aid is not as available
in California, both because few delegates went on to become legislators
or justices,42 and because of the lack of adequate records of those who
FORNIA 1846-1850 (1914) [hereinafter cited as GOODWIN]; C. SWISHER, MOTIVATION AND
POLITICAL TECHNIQUE IN THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1878-79 (1930)
[hereinafter cited as SWISHER]; Mason, Constitutional History of California, in CAL-
IFORNIA LEGISLATURE ASSEMBLY, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 75 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as Mason]; Palmer & Selvin, supra note 21; Sargent, The California Con-
stitutional Convention of 1878-9, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1917).
37. Mason, supra note 36, at 104.
38. See, e.g., Daily Alta California, March 13, 1879, at 2, col. 1; San Francisco
Chronicle, April 14, 1879, at 2; The Evening Bulletin, March 17, 1879, at 1, col. 1.
Because there was little controversy surrounding the 1849 convention, the few journals
surviving from that time are of little value. See, e.g., Supplemental Alta California for
the Steamer Oregon, Oct. 1, 1849, at 6, col. 4.
39. See 7 H. BANCROFT, HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 440 n.44 (1890).
40. tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Con-
stitutional Construction, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 157, 163 (1939).
41. Id. at 171-81. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (use of
debates in Congress as evidence of the framers' intent); Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S.
87 (1925) (use of opinions of delegate-justices as evidence of the framers' intent).
42. Although there were nearly two hundred delegates to the conventions, only
three wrote reported judicial opinions. While many did become legislators, early legisla-
tive journals merely catalogue legislative procedures and the nature of bills under discus-
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did.43
Three justices of the California Supreme Court who did attend the
1879 convention44 were Chief Justice David S. Terry, Justice Thomas
B. McFarland, and Justice Walter Van Dyke. Chief Justice Terry sat
on the bench prior to 1879, 45 -and Justices McFarland -and Van Dyke
were appointed in 1887 and 1898, respectively.4" Because only -two
of the justices sat on the bench after the 1879 convention, only their
later judicial opinions are useful in this sort of inquiry.47  Although
such a source of information is subject to some well-founded criticism,4 8
and thus may be entitled to little weight, these opinions do reveal the
significance of certain constitutional provisions in the minds of at least
two of the original framers.4 9
Early judicial opinions construing the state constitution in the pe-
riod immediately following the framing of both the 1849 and 1879 con-
stitutions are important for reasons other than the author's attendance
at a constitutional convention. Those opinions construing the first state
constitution illustrate what that document signified to the members of
the 1879 convention,"0 a construction which is especially important with
sion, when not devoted to the reports of state officials. Thus there is no record of de-
bates of the delegate-legislators. See, e.g., CALIF. ASSEMBLY, JOURNAL OF THE PROCEED-
INGS OF THE ASSEMBLY, 26th Sess. (1885); CALIF. ASSEMBLY, JOURNAL OF THE PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE ASSEMBLY, 12th Sess. (1861); CALIF. SENATE, JOURNAL OF THE LEois-
LATURE, 2d Sess. (1851).
43. But see cases cited note 49.
44. Compare 1879 Debates, supra note 29, at 4, with 125 Cal. iii (1899) and 5
Cal. iii (1855).
45. Chief Justice Terry was appointed late in 1855 and resigned four years later.
See 14 Cal. 3 (1859); 5 Cal. iii (1855).
46. See 122 Cal. iii (1898); 71 Cal. v (1887).
47. Both men were, however, influential in the debates, Mr. Van Dyke being
Chairman of the Committee on the Declaration of Rights. See 1879 DEBATES, supra
note 29, at 179, 343-44.
48. Cf. tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in
Constitutional Construction, 27 CALIF. L. REv. 157, 177-78 (1939). The criticism is
that use of these opinions incorrectly assumes that these few individuals were experts
on every issue before the convention, that they had correctly ascertained the intention
of all the members of the convention, and that they had accurately revealed this inten-
tion in the context of their arguments.
49. See, e.g., In re Zhizhuzza, 147 Cal. 328, 81 P. 955 (1905) (Van Dyke, J.);
Ingraham v. Weidler, 139 Cal. 588, 73 P. 415 (1903) (McFarland, J.); Dailey v. Supe-
rior Court, 112 Cal. 94, 101-10, 44 P. 458, 460-66 (1896) (dissenting opinion of Mc-
Farland, J.).
50. See 1879 DEBATES, supra note 29, at 264, referring to the construction of sec-
tion 11 of the Declaration of Rights by the California Supreme Court in People ex rel.
Smith v. Judge of the Twelfth Dist., 17 Cal. 547 (1861); cf. Camron v. Kenfield, 57
Cal. 550 (1881), where the supreme court, sitting soon after the present constitution
was approved by the voters, stated, "The new Constitution was framed in view of the
construction of the language used in the former Constitution . . . . [The framers of
the present Constitution repeated the words employed by the former. We are forced
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respect to any provision which was carried over from the 1849 constitu-
tion to the present one. Furthermore, in regard to the Declaration of
Rights, cases decided prior to -the development of federal leadership
in the civil liberties field 5' can be expected to reveal a more inde-
pendent construction of the state constitution than those which occurred
after the federal Bill of Rights began to be applied to the states. 2 Such
an assumption is based on the premise that later courts not only had
authoritative reasoning in federal cases to contend with, but were in-
creasingly bound by federal decisions under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Reference to these early cases does not directly reveal the
framers' intent, of course, but such opinions do constitute a ready sec-
ondary source.
Proceedings of Sister State Constitutional Conventions
and Sister State Judicial Decisions
Because of the great influence which the Iowa and New York
Constitutions had on the Declaration of Rights as formulated in 1849, 3
the histories of those conventions might seem to provide an additional
source for finding the intent of the framers. Aside from a few refer-
ences in the records of the debates by delegates who had originally
come from New York or Iowa,5 4 however, there is no evidence that
the framers relied on or were exposed to written histories of the pro-
ceedings of those conventions.
In contrast to the unimportance of the proceedings of sister state
constitutional conventions, early California cases did attach weight to
the judgments of other jurisdictions construing the protections of their
respective bills of rights. Opinions of courts of other jurisdictions have,
of course, always played a role in the resolution of cases, whether simi-
lar legislation, constitutional provisions, or legal issues were involved.
A problem which confronted the California Supreme Court at an early
point was how much weight to give cases construing provisions similar
to the conclusion that they used these words in the sense which had been attributed to
them by the Supreme Court." Id. at 554.
51. The concern by the United States Supreme Court over civil liberties is gener-
ally dated from the time immediately following World War I, when Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) was decided. See generally R. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN
SUPREME COURT 169-74, 180-219 (1960).
52. This process began with Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) when the
First Amendment was made applicable to the states.
53. GooDwiN, supra note 36, at 233-34.
54. The 1849 convention was strongly influenced by Mr. William Gwin, later
United States Senator from California, who had attended the Iowa constitutional con-
vention of 1846 and had brought to the California convention copies of the Iowa Consti-
tution. 1849 DEBATES, supra note 29, at 24-25; Mason, supra note 36, at 89. Reference
was also made to the New York proceedings. 1849 DEBATES, supra note 29, at 39.
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or identical to the one before the court. Five years after the 1849 con-
vention, the court declared:
It is a safe rule of construction, that, when framing the organic law
of this State, the Convention thought proper to borrow provisions
from the Constitutions of other States, which -provisions had already
received a judicial construction, they adopted the provisions in view
of such construction, and acquiesced in its correctness.55
This deference to the opinions of -an out-of-state court was not always
the practice, as the same court stated shortly thereafter, reciting a bet-
ter rule: "[Tjhe Constitution must generally be construed more by its
own terms than by the aid of authorities from other States. ... " In
other words, decisions of other forums concerning a constitutional provi-
sion can be used to illustrate the court's understanding of the meaning
of that provision; on the other hand, unless a decision was specifically
referred to at the convention,57 it cannot be ,taken as revealing the in-
tention of the framers in enacting such a provision.
The Declaration of Rights
Whatever the value of the various sources previously discussed for
finding the intent of -the framers or the early significance of the consti-
tution, these sources are less ,useful 'than might be expected with regard
to the Declaration of Rights. At both conventions, there was little con-
sideration of the substantive content of the first article of the constitu-
tion, wherein the Declaration of Rights is set forth. The paucity of de-
bate over these provisions was not so much a product of indifference
or dismissal of the importance of the Declaration of Rights, 58 as it was
a result of other concerns of the delegates which dominated the con-
ventions.
In 1849, the lawlessness accompanying the demise of Mexican au-
thority and 'the immigration of thousands of gold seekers caused a popu-
lar demand for some kind of law.5" The convention reflected this de-
sire, the proceedings taking place smoothly and rapidly, the constitu-
tion being formulated with an eye to what would be acceptable to Con-
gress!0° The Declaration of Rights was drafted during the first week
of the convention, taking provisions both from various state constitu-
tions and from the United States Constitution. For purposes of ex-
pediency, most of the sections were adopted with little or no debate.61
55. People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46, 50 (1854).
56. People v. Burbank, 12 Cal. 378, 387 (1859); accord, Cohen v. Wright, 22
Cal. 293, 311-12 (1863).
57. See 1879 DEBATEs, supra note 29, at 264, where a California case was utilized
to illustrate the meaning of a particular provision of the 1849 constitution.
58. See 1879 DEBATEs, supra note 29, at 240.
59. Mason, supra note 36, at 84-86.
60. See 1849 DEBATES, supra note 29, at 149-51 (remarks of Mr. Gilbert).
61. Id. at 30-48, 288-94, 298. See also, GooniN, supra note 36, at 231-39.
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In 1878, a new convention was called to correct deficiencies of
the old constitution in the areas of taxation, corporations, and special
legislation, as well as to try -to deal with the problems caused by the
great influx of Chinese immigrants.62 While the Declaration of Rights
was changed in certain respects, 63 it did not command the attention of
most of the delegates. 64 Newspapers reflected the concerns which
brought the convention together, neither the old nor the new Declara-
tion of Rights provoking great reaction.6 5 While some insights can be
obtained as to certain provisions, the record of the debates and the
newspapers do not provide thoughtful discussions of the content of the
various sections of article I of the constitution.
Even with this lack of contemporary commentary on the various
provisions of the Declaration of Rights, the following can be of some
aid in ascertaining the intent of the framers. The debates and proceed-
ings of the constitutional conventions of 1849 and 1879 are frequently
utilized and provide the best indication of the original meaning of the
constitution. Although obviously of limited utility, the brief statements
in voters' pamphlets describing amendments or additions to the Declar-
ation of Rights are an additional resource. Discussions in newspapers,
while not having the merit of a more scholarly approach, can serve as
constructional aids.
Because histories of the conventions and of the state during the
time of the conventions allow a broader view of what took place, these
materials supply an important understanding of the concerns of the time
which are not fully presented in other sources. In addition, early de-
cisions of California courts are a measure of what the constitution sig-
nified at a time contemporaneous with the conventions, prior to federal
involvement in the civil liberties field. These opinions are, however,
clearly a secondary source. Certain judicial opinions authored by for-
mer delagates are also helpful as minor indicia of the intent of the fram-
ers. These sources will be utilized in the following discussion of certain
provisions of the Declaration of Rights, wherein the lack of substantive
discussion of many of the provisions,66 and the value of looking to
62. SWISHER, supra note 36, at 5-16. See Palmer & Selvin, supra note 21, at 17-
20.
63. See Daily Alta California Supplement, May 5, 1879, at 5, col. 1.
64. The attitude of the convention is illustrated by the remarks of Mr. Van Dyke,
chairman of the Committee on the Declaration of Rights: "Tlhe committee adopted
the plan to take up . . . different sections of article I of the present Constitution, and
consider the same as a basis for their action, with the understanding that only such pro-
visions should be altered or amended as the public interest seemed to demand." 1879
DEBATES, supra note 29, at 178.
65. See, e.g.. Daily Alta California, March 13, 1879, at 2, col. 1; San Francisco
Chronicle, April 14, 1879, at 2, col. 2; The Morning Call, April 25, 1879, at 3, col.
1-6.
66. See text accompanying notes 69-114 infra.
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historical sources when available,67 will become apparent.
Freedom of Speech
The free speech -provision of the California Declaration of Rights
is contained in article I, section 9 of the California Constitution:
[1] Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his senti-
ments on all subjects, [2] being responsible for the abuse of that
right; [3] and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or of the press. [4] In all criminal prosecutions
for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if
it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is
true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to
determine the law and the fact. Indictments found, or information
laid, for publications in newspapers shall be tried in the county
where such newspapers have their publication office, or in the
county where the party alleged to be libeled resided at the time
of the alleged publication, unless the place of trial shall be changed
for good cause.
As is obvious from even a cursory reading of the text, the section is
overly long, containing material which more properly belongs in a stat-
ute. 68  Especially when compared ,to the terse wording of the First
Amendment,60 the California provision seems quite verbose.
The section may be broken down into four subparts: 1) an affirm-
ative assertion that all citizens may freely speak their opinions; 2) a
provision allowing for liability if that right is abused; 3) a prohibition
against legislative enactments infringing upon that right, essentially a
paraphrase of -the language of the First Amendment dealing with free-
dom of speech; and 4) a detailed section spelling out liability and pro-
cedure in libel cases. As far as the scope of this section is concerned,
the key element is the second phrase, providing liability for abuse of
the right to speak one's opinion freely. This second provision might
be deemed unimportant, if read merely as a means of establishing lia-
bility for defamation.70 Yet even if interpreted narrowly, the phrase
67. See text accompanying notes 142-70 infra.
68. See PRoPoSED REVISION, supra note 9, at 23, which would eliminate the libel
provisions and recommend statutes be passed in their place, leaving the first sentence
essentially as it reads now. As it will appear on the November 1974 ballot, the first
sentence of the present provision remains substantially the same, so that the following
analysis will be valid even if the proposition passes. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF
STATE, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, PROPOSITIONS AND PROPOSED
LAws 27 (General Election, Nov. 5, 1974) (voter pamphlet) [hereinafter cited as 1974
VOTER PAMPVPHLET].
69. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution reads: "Congress
shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ....
70. See CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, Article I, Declara-
tion of Rights, Background Study #3, in CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COM-
qualifies an otherwise absolute provision. 71 Moreover, because it is not
limited expressly to defamation, the provision is capable of a broader
construction. Thus the host of restrictions which governments have at-
tempted to place on freedom of speech in the past-prohibitions
against the use of fighting words, 72 profanity, 73 obscenity,74 and incite-
ment7 ---could conceivably come within the parameters of this pro-
vision, thereby giving constitutional sanction, under section 9, to lim-
itations on the right to free speech. If so construed, section 9 would
clearly be more limited on its face than the First Amendment.
Such -an interpretation is not compelled, however, when the sec-
tion is examined as a whole. The abuse phrase is not attached to that
part of section 9 which is almost identical to the language of the First
Amendment. As a result, the phrase operates only to restrict the af-
firmative right granted -to -all citizens. The California free speech guar-
antee thus incorporates -the language of the First Amendment, plus an
affirmative right of speech qualified by a provision for responsibility.
Therefore, unless the first two elements are mere surplusage, the state
right appears to be broader than the language of the First Amendment.
The difference 'between the federal and state provisions can be
explained in the following manner. Both provisions command that no
law abridge freedom of speech or of the press. Moreover, Californians
have an express right that is only implied in the federal document:
all citizens may speak and write as they please. This right is subject
only to liability for defamation, the abuse phrase necessarily being read
with the libel provisions in ,the latter half of the section.76 If read in
this manner, a reading which is commanded by the structure of the sec-
tion, section 9 is broader than the federal right.77 Thus, merely on the
MISSION, ARTICLE I, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, MINUTES AND BACKGROUND STUDIES 19
(1969).
71. The construction of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
urged by Justices Black and Douglas, that these rights are absolutes, incapable of being
qualified by the government, has less justification when applied to section 9. See, e.g.,
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293-97 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
72. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
73. See People v. Cohen, 1 Cal. App. 3d 94, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1969), rev'd sub
nom., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
74. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
75. See Chicago v. Terminiello, 400 111. 23, 79 N.E.2d 39 (1948), rev'd, 337 U.S.
1(1949).
76. See Werner v. Southern Cal. Associated Newspapers, 35 Cal. 2d 121, 216 P.2d
825 (1950).
77. Although this construction has not been applied in modern cases, it is not new.
See Dailey v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. 94, 97-98, 44 P. 458, 459 (1896). In Dailey,
a prior restraint case, the court compared the First Amendment and section 9:
"Ulf there is a material difference [between the state and federal] provisions . . . the
provision here considered is the broader, and gives [the defendant] greater liberty in
the exercise of the right granted." Id. at 97-98, 44 P. at 459. See also Diamond v.
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basis of the text of section 9, California courts have constitutional sanc-
tion to require greater protection of the right to free speech than the
federal courts require. 78
The history of section 9 is, unfortunately, of little help in discover-
ing whether the framers intended section 9 to be construed more
broadly than the language of the First Amendment. The provision was
lifted from the Iowa Constitution of 184679 'and placed in the 1849 Con-
stitution without debate. 0 When the present constitution was drafted
thirty years later, an additional sentence was 'added concerning venue
in criminal libel cases.81 Beyond this debate over the libel provisions,82
there was no discussion of freedom of speech or the press.
Newspaper accounts of the time indicate that protection of free-
dom of speech and of the press was not considered an arguable issue.
The newspapers urged an absolute freedom of the press, 8 motivated,
perhaps, by more than an impartial desire to promote -the general wel-
fare. Available histories of the conventions are also of little relevance,
as is often the case with civil liberties, because the Declaration of Rights
was not at issue in either convention.84
In view of this bare historical record, consideration needs to be
given to the importance which should be placed on the difference be-
tween the California and federal provisions, absent any indication from
the framers. A newspaper reference in 1849 to the bill of rights as con-
taining sections "of the usual character," '8 and a statement at the 1879
convention of the need to adopt the federal Bill of Rights into the Cali-
Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 337, 521 P.2d 460, 465, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468, 473 (1974) (Mosk,
I., dissenting): "I deem the 27 sections in article I of the California Constitution...
to be arguably more embracive than the first 10 amendments, plus the Fourteenth, of
the United States Constitution."
78. But cf. CALIFORN CONSTrrUTION REVISION COMImssioN, Article I, Declara-
tion of Rights, Background Study #3, in CALIFORNU CONSTITUTION REvISIoN CoMMS-
SION, ARTICLE I, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, MINUTES AN BACKGROUND STUm.s 16
(1969): "It should be noted at the outset that federal guarantees of these same rights
of speech and press have thoroughly permeated this area of the law. Federal courts
have been almost zealous in their sensitivity to questions of free speech." See note 89
infra.
79. 1849 DEBATES, supra note 29, at 30-31.
80. Id. at 41, 294.
81. 1879 DEBATEs, supra note 29, at 343.
82. See San Francisco Evening Bulletin, March 17, 1879, at 1, col. 2; Daily Alta
California, Nov. 11, 1878, at 3, col. 2.
83. Daily Alta California, Nov. 11, 1878, at 3, col. 2.
84. See text accompanying notes 58-65 supra. In subsequent discussion of the his.
tory of particular provisions, only those sources will be referred to which offer positive
evidence of the framers' intent. The quality and quantity of the sources vary with the
nature of the provisions.
85. Supplemental Alta California for the Steamer Oregon, Oct. 1, 1849, at 6, cal.
fornia Constitution, 6 might indicate that only the guarantees of the first
eight amendments to the United States Constitution were to be embod-
ied in article I of the state document. If so, a persistent question re-
mains as to why this was not the case.
The opportunity was present at both conventions to use the exact
language -that was used in Philadelphia in 1787. While ,the Bill of
Rights has obviously been a model of various state constitutional protec-
tions of individual liberty, the framers of the -two California constitutions
utilized an eclectic method, trying -to formulate the protections best
suited to California in the nineteenth century.8 7  As exemplified by the
language of section 9, at least one provision differs from the analogous
federal right not only in form, but in substance. It should not be as-
sumed that the California provision can be lightly glossed over as identi-
cal to the First Amendment when, in fact, it provides greater protection.
In a 1938 decision involving freedom of speech and religion, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court declared that good reason must exist before a
state provision can be construed differently from a similar federal one;s8
it is, submitted that the text of section 9 provides such a cogent reason. 89
86. 1879 DEBATES, supra note 29, at 240.
87. In 1849, only one section, that relating to seizures and searches, was taken
from the United States Constitution (amendment IV). 1849 DEBATES, supra note 29,
at 47-48. See text accompanying notes 117-20 infra. In 1879, the Sixth Amendment
was utilized in the formulation of section 13, the criminal procedure section, but the ex-
act text of the federal amendment was not used, and the sections differed in subject mat-
ter. See 1879 DEBATES, supra note 29, at 179. The right to confront witnesses, part
of the Sixth Amendment, was expressly rejected at both the 1849 and 1879 conventions.
Id. at 343 (remarks of Mr. Van Dyke), 344; 1849 DEBATES, supra note 29, at 294. This
omission is rectified in the November 1974 ballot proposal, which includes a right to
confront witnesses. 1974 VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note 68, at 26, 71.
88. Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 12 Cal. 2d 85, 89, 82 P.2d 391, 393 (1938), appeal
dismissed, 306 U.S. 621 (1939).
89. The dominance of the United States Supreme Court in protecting First
Amendment freedoms has been a particular trademark of the Warren Court. See Kal-
yen, "Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open"-A Note on Free Speech and the Warren
Court, 67 MICH. L. REv. 289 (1968). While the Court has not rendered the right to
free speech an absolute and has left some areas untouched, federal preemption of this
field is quite obvious, and the deference of state courts to federal precedents and tests
nearly complete. See Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 422, 509 P.2d 497, 508, 107
Cal. Rptr. 681, 692 (1973) (utilizing test laid down in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968)); Dillon v. Municipal Court, 4 Cal. 3d 860, 484 P.2d 945, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 777 (1971); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P.2d
982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967).
While the state supreme court has forged ahead in several cases concerning free
speech, it has relied on the First Amendment and United States Supreme Court cases
in doing so. See, e.g., Siegel v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 10 Cal. 3d 156, 514 P.2d
967, 110 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1973); Danskin v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 28 Cal. 2d
536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946). But see Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460,
113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974), where the California Supreme Court reversed itself in a free
speech case after a decision by the United States Supreme Court directly contrary to
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Diamond v. Bland
A recent case provides an excellent illustration of -the potentialities
of utilizing -the state constitution in the free speech area, of -the domi-
nance of the United States Supreme Court in this area, and of the con-
cept of an independent state constitution. Diamond v. Bland9  over-
ruled an earlier decision involving the same parties,91 which held that
the First Amendment and section 9 of the Declaration of Rights al-
lowed defendant to leaflet peacefully and -to petition for signatures in
plaintiff's shopping center. This holding was premised largely on
United States Supreme Court precedents which required private owners
of what constituted a "public forum" to refrain from preventing the ex-
ercise of free speech on their premises.92
The parties were back before the supreme court in 1974. In the
four-year interim, -the United States Supreme Court decided Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner,93 the majority ruling that the First Amendment did
not require a shopping center owner -to allow leafletters to circulate
handbills in the center which were unrelated to ,the function of the
shopping center. The majority of -the California Supreme Court in the
second Diamond decision felt constrained on the basis of Lloyd to over-
rule the earlier decision, 94 despite Justice Mosk's objection that section
9 of the Declaration of Rights required that persons be allowed to cir-
culate handbills in shopping centers even if the First Amendment did
not.
95
Diamond v. Bland is unique in several ways. It represents an
area where the Burger Court has retreated from the positions of the
Warren Court on freedom of speech. Moreover, contrary to the usual
situation, in which the United States Supreme Court has set higher
standards than state courts had previously required,9" a state court had
the opportunity to require higher state standards in a free speech case.9T
the prior California decision. The case is consistent with the idea that the United States
Supreme Court sets national standards in First Amendment cases, which state courts
should feel constrained to follow.
90. 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974).
91. Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970).
92. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See also Lloyd Corp.
v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 571-86 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
94. The majority opinion made it quite clear that it considered the federal decision
controlling, although it is unclear whether the reasoning in Lloyd or the mere fact that
earlier decisions were limited by Lloyd was the determining factor. California decisions
which were relied on in the first Diamond decision were distinguished in a footnote.
Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 334 n.3, 521 P.2d 460, 462 n.3, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468,
470 n.3 (1974).
95. Id. at 335-46, 521 P.2d at 463-70, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 471-78.
96. See notes 78 & 89 supra.
97. No attempt was made by the majority to investigate the history of the Califor-
That it did not chooose to do so reflects the dominance of the United
States Supreme Court, which continues to set the parameters in cases
involving First Amendment freedoms. Although it may be surprising
that the California court, a most independent state court, did not assert
its independence at a time when the United States Supreme Court is
retreating from prior positions, such a decision merely emphasizes that
the time is not yet ripe for a state court to require more protection of
freedom of speech than the United States Supreme Court provides un-
der its interpretation of the First Amendment.
Double Jeopardy
Section 13 of the first article of the California Constitution pro-
vides the state's basic criminal procedure protections, similar to those
set forth in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Con-
stitution. This section contains the state prohibition against double
jeopardy: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same of-
fense . . . ." This language closely resembles that in the Fifth
Amendment." Indeed, comparison of the two provisions supplies
good reason why California courts have held that the guarantees in both
documents are the same. 9 In contrast to other California provisions
which differ literally from federal amendments, 10 there is little room
for a differing construction based on the text alone.
The history of the conventions also does not offer any ground upon
which to distinguish the federal and state protections. The double jeo-
pardy clause of the 1849 Constitution, 10 1 slightly different from its pres-
ent form, was borrowed from the New York Constitution.0 2  As in the
case of the free speech section, there was no debate over the substance
of the provision. The criminal procedure section was changed in the
present constitution, using the 1849 section and the Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution as guides.'0 3  Again, the double
jeopardy provision was not discussed on the floor. 04 While the text
nia provision to see if it was capable of a broader interpretation than the first Amend-
ment. Justice Mosk, for the dissent, spoke of the history of the California Constitution
in general terms, concluding that it was at least arguable that section 9 is capable of
a broader construction than the First Amendment. He did not, however, analyze section
9 in detail.
98. The United States Constitution, Amendment V, provides: "nor shall any per-
son be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... "
99. See, e.g., Gomez v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 640, 328 P.2d 976 (1958);
Gonzalez v. Municipal Court, 32 Cal. App. 3d 706, 108 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1973).
100. See text accompanying notes 68-97 supra and notes 142-70 injra.
101. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8 (1849) reads: "No person shall be subject to be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offence."
102. 1849 D.BATES, supra note 29, at 30-31, 294.
103. 1879 DEBATES, supra note 29, at 178-79.
104. Id. at 343-44.
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of -the Fifth Amendment does not appear to have been used when the
final text of the double jeopardy portion of section 13 was decided
upon, the difference between the language used in either 1849 or 1879
and that of the federal amendment is not substantial. 10 5
Early cases agreed that the state and federal double jeopardy sec-
tions were similar:
The universal maxim of the common law of England, as Sir Win.
Blackstone expresses it, "that no man is to be brought into jeopardy
of his life more than once for the same offense," is embraced in
Article V, of Amendments to the Constitution of the United States,
and in the Constitutions of several States. .... 10.
Yet, despite cases construing the provisions as similar,' and leadership
by the United States Supreme Court in the criminal procedure field 08
which is almost equal to its supremacy in protecting First Amendment
freedoms, the California Supreme Court has required, under section
13, a more stringent protection for a defendant in terms of double jeop-
ardy. 100
In Cardenas v. Superior Court,110 a mistrial had been granted on
the court's own motion, without the defendant's consent, but for his
benefit. The court held that another trial would constitute subjecting
the accused to double jeopardy, in violation of section 13, explicitly re-
jecting a contemporary United States Supreme Court decision to the
contrary."' One reason for this holding may be that the double jeop-
ardy protection provided by the Fifth Amendment was not applied to
the states until 1969, in Benton v. Maryland."2  As a consequence,
the California court at the -time of Cardenas did not operate under the
constraint of federal decisions on double jeopardy. However, the court
has gone on record since Benton was decided 'as maintaining its stricter
105. This applies to similar rights guaranteed by section 13 and the federal Consti-
tution: the rights to a speedy and public trial, assistance of counsel, due process of law,
witnesses appearing at trial, and the protection against self-incrimination.
106. People v. Webb, 38 Cal. 467, 477 (1869).
107. E.g., Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 575, 498 P.2d 1079, 102 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1972); Gomez v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 640, 328 P.2d 976 (1958); People
v. Cage, 48 Cal. 323 (1874). See generally Note, The Double Jeopardy Clause: Re-
fining the Constitutional Proscription Against Successive Criminal Prosecutions, 19
U.C.L.A.L. Rv. 804 (1972); Comment, A New Approach to Double Jeopardy, 10
HAsTiNGs L.J. 188 (1958).
108. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
109. Curry v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 707, 470 P.2d 345, 87 Cal. Rptr. 361
(1970); Cardenas v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 273, 363 P.2d 889, 14 Cal. Rptr. 657
(1961); Falk, supra note 2, at 95.
110. 56 Cal. 2d 273, 363 P.2d 889, 14 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1961).
111. Id. at 275-76, 363 P.2d at 891, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 659, rejecting the holding in
Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961).
112. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
standard.' 1
3
What is important for -this analysis is that, as distinguished from
section 9 which provides a textual basis for the court to give freedom
of speech broader protection than under the federal Constitution, the
double jeopardy provision of section 13 is identical in substance, on its
face, to the federal requirement. Yet the California courts have shown
a high degree of independence in construing the double jeopardy provi-
sion of -the state constitution. Perhaps this merely illustrates the fact
that the text and history of the state provisions are only two of many
factors which determine the way in which a provision will be construed,
and that'these two factors have been relatively unimportant in decisions
which have rested solely on the state constitution."'
Seizures and Searches and the Right to Privacy
The prohibition against unreasonable seizures and searches is em-
bodied in article I, section 19, of the California Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but on probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched and the -persons and things to be seized.
It is unique not only in its origin, but also in the treatment it has re-
ceived in California, 1 5 especially in light of recent United States Su-
preme Court decisions reversing the spirit, if not the letter, of the War-
ren Court's construction of the Fourth Amendment.16
The texts of the federal and state provisions are more than sub-
stantially similar."' California's protects against "unreasonable seiz-
113. Curry v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 707, 716, 470 P.2d 345, 350-51, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 361, 366-67 (1970). Despite the stricter standard reaffirmed in Curry, subsequent
cases have treated the federal and state provisions in a similar manner, although they
did not deal with the point discussed in Curry. See, e.g., Bryan v. Superior Court, 7
Cal. 3d 575, 498 P.2d 1079, 102 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1972); Richard M. v. Superior Court,
4 Cal. 3d 370, 482 P.2d 664, 93 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1971).
114. See note 20 supra.
115. See, e.g., People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955) (exclusionary
rule adopted in California; illegally seized evidence incompetent at trial). See also
People v. Moore, 69 Cal. 2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1968) (exclusionary
rule applied to commitment proceedings for addicts); People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755,
290 P.2d 855 (1955) (vicarious exclusionary rule; illegally seized evidence inadmissible
as against any defendant).
116. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); United States v. Robin-
son, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
117. United States Constitution, Amendment IV provides: "The right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
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ures and searches," while the federal provision uses -the more familiar
phrase, searches and seizures. It is no coincidence that this is the most
significant difference between these virtually identical texts: although
most of the language in -the 1849 Declaration of Rights came from
either the New York or Iowa Constitutions,118 the seizures and searches
section was taken directly from the United States Constitution. 1 9  Al-
though there was debate over the provision's last clause, this was due
only to a clerical error in the draft section which specified "papers and
things" instead of "persons and things." This redundancy was quickly
corrected without objection.' 2 The section was readopted without
change or discussion by the 1879 convention. 2'
The background of section 19 thus differs from that of the two
sections previously considered. 2 2 Instead of being broader than or
merely substantially similar to the federal provision, section 19 is iden-
tical. 23  Not only does this prevent -any differing construction based
on the text, but the history of the conventions, contemporary accounts,
and early cases indicate that no disparity between the federal and state
guarantees was intended. However, the words "unreasonable seizures
and searches" present great room for judicial interpretation,2 4 depend-
ing upon the myriad of factual situations within which these cases arise.
In addition to the near impossibility of uniformity among jurisdictions
in construing the term "unreasonable," higher standards, compelled by
local needs, are always permissible unless in conflict with another fed-
118. 1849 DEBATES, supra note 29, at 30-31.
119. Id. at 47-48.
120. Id. While the use of the conjunctive instead of the disjunctive might be an
indication that the framers were attempting to differentiate the California and federal
provisions, it amounts to nothing of substance. The great majority of cases arising un-
der section 19 or the Fourth Amendment concern the first clause, turning most often
on the interpretation of 'unreasonable,' and the substitution of 'and' for 'or' does not
change what must be included in a warrant.
121. 1879 DEBATES, supra note 29, at 270.
122. See text accompanying notes 68-97 & 98-114 supra.
123. As far as the ability of state courts to require stricter standards than the
United States Supreme Court is concerned, even when provisions are identical, the state
court's authority to do so is clear. See cases cited note 9 supra; Falk, supra note 2,
at 281-82. If the provisions are identical, however, the state court is not relying on in-
dependent language in the state constitution, but is disagreeing with the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the same words.
124. See PROPOSED REviSIONS, supra note 9, at 28 (Comment to proposed § 21);
Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 330. Profes-
sor Traynor argues for substantial local leeway in implementing the Mapp decision,
which applied Amendment IV and the federal exclusionary rule to the states: "There
is no substitute for close evaluation of the local context to determine what is unreason-
able." But see Manwaring, California and the Fourth Amendment, 16 STAN. L. REv.
318 (1964). Manwaring argued that decisions of California courts since the exclusion-
ary rule was applied in this state have evaded the thrust of the rule by employing lower
standards of what was unreasonable.
eral provision. As is the case with the prohibition against double jeop-
ardy,125 the California Supreme Court has required higher standards,
with respect both to particular factual situations12 and to rules of evi-
dence. 127
The Right to Privacy
A provision conceptually related to section 19 was recently added
to the state constitution. A right to privacy, long considered implicit
in the Declaration of Rights, 121 was explicitly inserted into section 1 of
article I in 1972.129 The importance of this provision goes far beyond
criminal procedure, since it provides a constitutional basis for a tort ac-
tion for invasion of the right to privacy. Although there has been abun-
dant discussion concerning this new right,130 there have been few de-
cisions since -the amendment was ratified by the voters.''
The effect of the privacy amendment on section 19 is uncertain.
When the prohibition against unreasonable seizures and searches and
the new right to privacy are read together, however, it appears that
Californians now have a broader protection against wrongful invasion
of the person, home and other effects than the explicit provisions of
the federal Bill of Rights 12 grant to citizens of the United States."'
125. See note 123 supra.
126. See, e.g., People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408
(1973); People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
127. See, e.g., People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955). Although
it has been consistently held that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally compelled
on the state level, but rather is a judicially evolved rule of evidence, the basis for the
rule is the constitutional protection embodied in section 19. Kaplan v. Superior Court,
6 Cal. 3d 150, 160-62, 491 P.2d 1, 7-8, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649, 655-56 (1971); People v.
Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 442, 282 P.2d 905, 910 (1955).
128. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 255, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1970); Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952);
cf. People v. Baldwin, 37 Cal. App. 3d 385, 112 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1974) (rejecting pri-
vacy claim based on § 1 as applied to public restroom).
129. California Constitution article I, section 1 reads: "All people are by nature
free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are ...pursu-
ing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."
130. See, e.g., Note, People v. Triggs: A New Concept of Personal Privacy in
Search and Seizure Law, 25 HASTINGs L.J. 575 (1974). See also Bender, Privacies of
Life, HARPER'S, April 1974, at 36; Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for
Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 670 (1973).
131. See Annenberg v. Southern California Dist. Council of Laborers, 38 Cal. App.
3d 637, 113 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1974); People v. Baldwin, 37 Cal. App. 3d 385, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 290 (1974); People v. Parker, 33 Cal. App. 3d 842, 109 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1973).
132. The landmark decision of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), as-
serted that a right to privacy was implicit in the Bill of Rights. See Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967): "[T]he Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into
a general constitutional 'right to privacy.' That Amendment protects individual privacy
against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often
have nothing to do with privacy at all. Other provisions of the Constitution protect
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On the other hand, it is possible that the two provisions, -taken together,
will not be considered -to grant to individuals any more rights than
would -accrue if each provision were read separately. Section 19 could
be taken as a specific limitation on governmental interference with the
right to privacy, so that the more general right guaranteed in section
I would have no effect on search and seizure cases.
Nevertheless, instances of governmental interference analogous to
search and seizure cases, yet involving no real search, are occurring
with greater frequency as more sophisticated detection devices are de-
veloped. 13 4  While governmental demands for information, involving
electronic surveillance or computer banks, for example, have been
handled under section 19 or the Fourth Amendment, the section 1 right
to privacy might provide a better basis for challenging such action. In
any case, a textual basis for broader individual rights in California
exists, whether section 1 is read by itself, or whether sections 1 and
19 are taken together.
An example can better illustrate the potentiality of utilizing the
right to privacy in cases which do not come within the seizures and
searches section. Private searches, which would otherwise come within
the prohibitions of section 19 or the Fourth Amendment, are not pro-
hibited by these provisions' 35 unless They are undertaken under govern-
mental supervision or at the immediate urging of .an official agency. 130
Such private searches are, however, every bit as obnoxious. As a result
of the amendment of article I, section 1, a litigant can argue that his
constitutional right to privacy has been violated. Clearly a tort 'action
would lie for such a violation.'
personal privacy from other forms of governmental invasion. But the protection of a
person's general right to privacy . . . is . . . left largely to the law of the individual
States." See also People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408
(1973); Note, People v. Triggs: A New Concept of Personal Privacy in Search and
Seizure Law, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 575 (1974).
133. But see Bender, Privacies of Life, HARPER'S April 1974, at 36.
134. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
135. Dyas v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 628, 632, 522 P.2d 674, 676-77, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 114, 116-17 (1974); People v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 123, 128-29, 449 P.2d
230, 234, 74 Cal. Rptr. 294, 298 (1969); People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 595, 290
P.2d 505, 509 (1955); People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 775-76, 34 Cal. Rptr.
65, 69-70 (1963). See Note, Seizures by Private Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases,
19 STAN. L. REv. 608 (1967). See also Sackler v. Sackler, 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229
N.Y.S.2d 61, aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964), noted in
63 CoLuM. L. REv. 168 (1963) for discussions of the utility of the exclusionary rule
in civil cases. A constitutional right to privacy would buttress the arguments of the dis-
senting opinions in the above decisions.
136. Stapleton v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 447 P.2d 967, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575
(1968); People v. Garber, 275 Cal. App. 2d 119, 126-27, 80 Cal. Rptr. 214, 219 (1969),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 981 (1971).
137. See People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d 768, 776, 34 Cal. Rptr. 65, 69-70
(1963) discussing the availability of tort actions as reason for not extending the exclu-
A more difficult question is whether any information found or
seized in such a search should be barred as evidence when turned over
to authorities. The exclusionary rule has never been extended this
far,'38 and current doubts about the validity of the rule might result in
restriction, rather -than expansion, of its application.' 39 Nonetheless,
the basis for an extension of the rule to private searches does exist in
California: the reasoning against such an extension in the past was that
only unreasonable governmental intrusions were prohibited by the state
and federal seizures and searches provisions, 14  but the right to privacy
has no such limitation. Thus, since one rationale for the exclusionary
rule is that the judicial process should not be tainted with the fruit of
illegal action, the rule should apply no matter who the wrongdoer is.'
4 1
sionary rule to evidence illegally seized by a private person. See also Bivens v. Six Un-
known Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
proposing that the exclusionary rule be abandoned in favor of a statutory monetary
award for those who have had their Fourth Amendment rights violated.
138. See Stapleton v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 97, 100 n.2, 447 P.2d 967, 969
n.2, 73 Cal. Rptr. 575, 577 n.2 (1968). In declining to state an opinion as to whether
section 19 extends to private searches and seizures, the court contrasted an absolute right
to privacy against all intruders to the concept of limited government embodied in the
Bill of Rights. This juxtaposition of the right to privacy and the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures illustrates the broad applicability of section 1. This
section is, of course, a part of California's bill of rights, a document primarily aimed
at limiting governmental power. However, the right to privacy is not by its terms lim-
ited to state action. Current case law indicates the right to privacy will protect citizens
against all persons, not just government officials. See Annenberg v. Southern Cal. Dist.
Council of Laborers, 38 Cal. App. 3d 637, 113 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1974).
139. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Dyas v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 628,
637-38, 522 P.2d 674, 680-81, 114 Cal. Rptr. 114, 120-21 (1974) (Clark, J., dissenting);
Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People vs.
Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. RaV. 565 (1969); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970).
140. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 444, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955); People v.
Wolder, 4 Cal. App. 3d 984, 84 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1970).
141. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971);
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). But see Dyas v. Superior
Court, 11 Cal. 3d 628, 522 P.2d 674, 114 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1974), where the majority
opinion acknowledged extension of the exclusionary rule to private searches would
relieve courts of participation in illegal conduct, but it would not serve to deter private
illegal conduct. As the court did not reach the point whether private searches violate a
citizen's constitutional rights, the teaching remains rather significant dictum. The court
made no mention of a right to privacy in its discussion.
Whether the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, that of halting illegal
governmental action by barring the use of illegally seized evidence in court, would apply
to private searches has been questioned. Dyas v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 628, 632-
33, 522 P.2d 674, 676-77, 114 Cal. Rptr. 114, 116-17 (1974); see Note, Seizures by Pri-
vate Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L. REv. 608 (1967). For authori-
ties which place doubt on the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule, see note 139 su-
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Equal Protection
The most challenging provision of the Declaration of Rights, in
terms of textual analysis is the equal protection requirement of the Cali-
fornia Constitution.14 2  This provision is actually composed of three
sections, one of which is not in the Declaration of Rights at all, but
rather is found in article IV. Taken -together, sections 11 and 21 of
article I and section 16 of article IV provide substantially the same pro-
tection as the corresponding requirement in section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.143 Section 11 provides for the uniform operation of gen-
eral laws. As this one section has limited application, the federal
amendment would appear to be broader. Section 21 speaks in terms
of "privileges and immunities," language used in the Fourteenth
Amendment and Article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitu-
tion,14 and which has had limited impact at the federal level since
The Slaughter-House Cases'45 were decided one hundred years ago.
Section 21, as a whole, however, is worded differently from any part
of the federal document:
No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which
may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor
142. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 15, 485 P.2d 529, 538, 95 Cal. Rptr.
329, 338 (1971); County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal. 2d 378,
389-90, 196 P.2d 773, 780-81 (1948); In re Martin, 157 Cal. 51, 55-56, 106 P. 235,
237 (1909).
143. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 596 n.11, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249 n.11, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601, 609 n.11 (1971).
California Constitution article I, section 11 provides: "All laws of a general nature
shall have a uniform operation." Article IV, section 16 provides: "A local or special
statute is invalid in any case if a general statute can be made applicable." The Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads: "[N]or shall any State...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Cf. PROPOSED REVWSION, supra note 9, comment to proposed § 23, at 29, which
would include in the present section 21 an equal protection clause. As they appear on
the November 1974 ballot, the language of the California equal protection provisions
will be substantially revised. An explicit equal protection clause will be added, as will
a provision prohibiting discrimination in employment. 1974 VOTERS PAMPHMET, supra
note 68, at 26-27, 72. The present provisions will be changed somewhat, with section
11 of article I being merged with article IV, section 16. Id. at 27, 72.
Adding an equal protection clause, does not, of course, change California law, given
the cases construing the Fourteenth Amendment as being similar to the present Califor-
nia provisions. Since these latter provisions are not eliminated, the historical analysis
presented in this note, revealing specific intent that legislation dealing with economic
matters suffer strict judicial scrutiny, remains valid. The ballot proposal thus would
strengthen the present provisions without detracting from their force.
144. The language in the Fourteenth Amendment is "privileges or immunities."
Any significance in use of different conjunctions and the difference between the two fed-
eral provisions is not pertinent to this discussion. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
145. ld.
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shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or im-
munities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all
citizens.
This section has been interpreted as prohibiting the legislature from
granting to any group in the state favors which cannot be granted to
all citizens on the same terms.' 46 In other words, while section 11 reg-
ulates the operation of general laws, section 21 limits the application
of special legislation; together, they guarantee uniform protection of the
laws. Although these two sections are often cited as California's equal
protection guarantee,' 4 7 the rule that a general law should always be
applied instead of an applicable special law, embodied in article IV,
section 16, is also cited.14
8
That the three sections concern the same subject matter as the
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution-the uniform
application of legislation-is obvious. The problem is whether there
is a textual basis for interpreting the state provisions more broadly than
-their federal counterparts. The absolute phrasing of the Fourteenth
Amendment leaves little room for qualification as long as state action
is found. 49 This -amendment has been the basis for far-reaching de-
cisions by both the United States and the California Supreme Courts.',"
Although it would appear that any one of the California sections stand-
ing alone would not cover the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment,
all taken together, especially with possible penumbral effects, are
at least capable of a different interpretation.' 5'
To some extent, the constructional problem is how various ambig-
uous words and phrases are to be defined. Instead of the phrase
"equal protection of -the laws," which is itself capable of various con-
146. Cf. Linde, supra note 2, at 140-42. In an analysis of Oregon's "equal protec-
tion" clause, similar to the second clause of section 21 of article I of the California Con-
stitution, it is concluded that the state and federal provisions do not have the same effect,
the state provision being narrower.
147. See, e.g., Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d 405, 429 n.17, 509 P.2d 497, 513
n.17, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681, 697 n.17 (1973); Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner,
62 Cal. 2d 586, 588, 400 P.2d 321, 322, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 330 (1965).
148. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Shell Oil Co., 4 Cal. 3d 108, 120 n.8, 480 P.2d 953,
960 n.8, 93 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8 n.8 (1971); Whittaker v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 357,
367 n.15, 438 P.2d 358, 366 n.15, 66 Cal. Rptr. 710, 718 n.15 (1968).
149. See generally Cox, Foreward: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion
of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91 (1966); Developments in the Law-Equal Pro-
tection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
150. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); Perez v.
Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948).
151. Cf. CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, Article I, Declaration
of Rights, Background Study #2, Government and Laws in CALIFORNIA CONSTTTION
REVISION COMMISSION, ARTICLE I, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, MINUTES AND BACKGROUND
STUDIES 13-15 (1969).
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structions, California courts, wishing to 'apply the literal texts of these
provisions, must contend with definitional questions concerning "gen-
eral laws," "privileges and immunities," "same terms," and "special
laws.1 15 2  These questions are not easily resolved, but an analysis of
the history and early cases is more helpful with regard to these sections
than to any section previously discussed.
Sections 11 and 21 of article I, and section 16 of article IV were
present in the 1879 constitution in some form, but had different ori-
gins.'ri Section 11 was adopted into the first state constitution from
the Iowa Constitution of 1846.15 Although it was not amended in the
1879 convention, its meaning and utility were questioned."55 In the
interim between the two conventions, the California Supreme Court had
great difficulty in deciding what the section actually required.
At an early date it was held that the law must operate uniformly
upon the same set of facts, although some discrimination was permitted.
[1710 constitute partiality and the invidious discrimination against
which the Constitution aims, the denial to another of twhat is given
to one must be made upon substantially the same facts .... 156
The difficulty came when a later court decided this broad interpretation
could not 'be sustained under section 11 alone and read into it the priv-
ileges and immunities section which was later adopted in 1879 -as sec-
tion 2 1 .rr While this, in itself, might be a questionable bit of consti-
tutional construction, the court premised its reasoning on a false -as-
sumption that the framers had looked to the Iowa Constitution of
1857,1" s which contained a clause concerning privileges ,and immun-
ities, instead of the 1846 document, which was, of course, used by the
California constitutional convention of 1849. The problem was recti-
fied when section 21 was added 'to -the Declaration of Rights in 1879.
Article I, section 21 and article IV, section 25 (the predecessor
to article IV, section 16) were enacted in response to one of the chief
152. Cf. id. at 8-9.
153. Article IV, section 16 was amended in 1966. Prior to that time, it was only
concerned with certain enumerated areas. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 25 (1879).
154. 1849 DEBATES, supra note 29, at 31, 294.
155. '"The clause as it now stands is from the first constitution of the State of Iowa.
It resulted there in conflicting decisions and puzzled the Courts and everybody else....
It has been eliminated from four or five Constitutions." 1879 DEBATES, supra note 29,
at 264. Other delegates referred to the construction given the section by the supreme
court, and the section was not changed.
156. People ex rel. Smith v. Judge of the Twelfth Dist., 17 Cal. 547, 555 (1861).
157. Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal. 366 (1869).
158. IowA CoNST. OF 1857 art. I, § 6 provides: "[AIll laws of a general nature
shall have a uniform operation; the General Assembly shall not grant any citizen, or
class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not belong
equally to all citizens." IowA CoNsT. oF 1846 art. I, § 6 provides: "All laws of a gen-
eral nature shall have a uniform operation."
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concerns at the 1879 convention: the legislative practice of passing
laws favoring certain economic interests, particularly the railroads. 1 9
Although only section 11 had been in the original Declaration of Rights,
it is clear that the sections 11 and 21 were intended to be read together,
one regulating the application of general laws, the other restricting re-
sort to special legislation designed to benefit a favored minority or
group. 6 ' Thus California's equal protection law was rooted in the eco-
nomic problems with which the first constitution had not dealt. In con-
trast, the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
adopted before the present California Constitution was drafted, was di-
rected at the problems of racial discrimination encountered by the
newly freed black slaves.16'
Despite these differences in origin, the federal and state equal
protection provisions have had a more or less common development,
due to the general manner in which each was drafted and the fact that
the Fourteenth Amendment was directly applicable to the states. Thus
cases decided under the equal protection or due process clauses of that
amendment were binding on the states long before any of the first eight
federal amendments were considered part of state law.'6 2
The common development of the federal and state equal protec-
tion provisions is best exemplified through the tests and phraseology
utilized in applying these provisions both in California and on the fed-
eral level. Cases prior to the second World War spoke in terms of in-
vidious discrimination, reasonable classifications, and the responsibility
of the legislative branch to enact laws upon some rational basis (the
"old equal protection"). 63 More recent cases in California have
adopted the two-step test of the United States Supreme Court,' the
"new equal proteotion": if there is a fundamental interest or suspect
classification involved, there must be some compelling state interest as
a basis for that classification; otherwise the legislative act has presumed
validity, as in economic areas.' 65
159. Palmer & Selvin, supra note 21, at 17-18; cf. 1879 DEBATES, supra note 29,
at 179. It appears that several members of the convention offered formulations of what
was to become section 21. See generally SWISHER, supra note 36.
160. Cf. IowA CONST. OF 1857 art. I, § 6.
161. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 636 (1873).
162. Cf. 1879 DEBATES, supra note 29, at 240: "[Ilt is well known that the dec-
larations of the Constitution of the United States operate merely as a limitation upon
the powers of the Federal Union, and not upon the powers of this State, and hence the
necessity of reengrafting them in this portion of our Constitution under the title of 'dec-
laration of rights'."
163. See, e.g., People v. Western Fruit Growers, 22 Cal. 2d 494, 140 P.2d 13
(1943); Martin v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 93, 227 P. 762 (1924); People ex rel. Dan-
iels v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 436, 18 P. 413 (1888).
164. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal.
3d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1970).
165. See, e.g., In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 473 P.2d 999, 89 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1970);
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In other words, although it was explicitly intended at the second
constitutional convention that California courts be required to scrutinize
economic legislation in such a way that certain groups could not be fav-
ored by special laws, California courts have followed the national trend
of allowing economic legislation to stand if it has a rational basis. Re-
cent United States Supreme Court cases have revealed dissatisfaction
with the rigidity of the new equal protection standard, 166 but California
cases have not yet reflected this.
In fact, -the California Supreme Court has extended some of the
equal protection doctrines of the Warren Court in -the face of growing
doubts on the part of certain justices on the current United States Su-
preme Court that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to have so
broad an interpretation. 167 In declaring poverty a suspect classification,
and education and employment fundamental interests which require
strict judicial study of 'any legislation dealing with them,'68 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has ventured where the federal Court has re-
fused to go.'6 9  In doing so, the California court, by treating employ-
ment as fundamental interest and poverty as a suspect classification, has
begun to look critically at some economic legislation. While it is not
suggested that the two step test has been abandoned in California, the
idea of strict scrutiny of economic legislation has historical validity.
On the face of -the federal and state equal protection provisions
alone, it remains impossible to determine which is capable of a broader
interpretation. The history of the 1879 convention calls for the con-
clusion that special economic legislation should be given stricter scrut-
iny under the California Constitution than it is under the Fourteenth
Amendment, but the manner in which article I, section 21, was drafted
and article IV, section 16, was amended does not restrict the court to
any subject matter or require economic legislation to suffer stricter
standards than other types of law. The phrases in the California provi-
sions can be just as broadly construed as any interpretation of "equal
protection of the laws." Due to ambiguity concerning the interpre-
tation of California's equal protection law, the California Supreme
cf. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973) (utiliza-
tion of old equal protection-the rational relationship test-to strike down California's
automobile guest statute).
166. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, re-
hearing denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
167. See, e.g., id. at 40-44, 59-62.
168. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971)
(declaring poverty a suspect classification and education a fundamental right); Sail'er
Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (holding sex
a suspect classification and employment a fundamental right).
169. Compare cases cited note 168 supra, with San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education not a fundamental right and poverty
not a suspect classification).
Court's assertion that the provisions "provide generally equivalent but
independent protections in their respective jurisdictions"'170 is, perhaps,
the best solution.
Conclusion
If, despite textual and historical differences, it is found that provi-
sions in the California Declaration of Rights and the federal Bill of
Rights are substantially the same, this merely serves to demonstrate the
already well-documented supremacy of the United States Supreme
Court in protecting human rights. Nevertheless, with federal leader-
ship in this area wavering, the text and history of all state constitutions
have taken on greater importance than in the past. However, to base
a broader construction of a state constitutional provision on minor tex-
tual differences is to ignore the years of precedent which stress the sim-
ilarity between the California and United States Constitutions. Such
problems of construction may sometimes be resolved by an investiga-
tion into the history of the provision. Unfortunately, because the reli-
ability and quality of the available historical sources frequently render
such an inquiry difficult and its results uncertain, this ,technique can
only be employed with success in certain instances. Although many
California provisions are similar to their federal counterparts, and in
some cases almost identical, there do exist substantial textual differ-
ences which, if read literally, would provide greater protection. Spe-
cifically, the guarantees of freedom of speech land the right to privacy
go beyond those in the federal text. The equal protection provisions
and the guarantee against unreasonable seizures and searches (if read
with the right to privacy) are also capable of such a construction.
That such broad constructions are not to be found in the case law
illustrates that the text and history of the Declaration of Rights are not
determinative of how certain provisions will be construed. Yet they
are clearly relevant factors. One conclusion which may be drawn is
that the interpretation of a state provision depends not only on the
members of the state court, but also on the particular justices sitting
on the United States Supreme Court.17' This dependence is exempli-
170. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 588, 400 P.2d
321, 322, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 330 (1965).
171. The difference between the highest courts of California and the United States
is aptly illuminated in a recent case. In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974), the United States Supreme Court ruled that illegally seized evidence could be
used in a grand jury proceeding. This is not the first attack made on the exclusionary
rule by members of the Court, and it appears that the majority in Calandra rejected the
underlying rationale for the rule, even though the case itself concerns only the use of
illegal evidence before a grand jury. Compare Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 422-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) with United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355-67 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The exclusionary
rule was adopted in this state in 1955, six years before the United States Supreme Court
applied it to all the states, and it has been followed consistently. See note 115 supra.
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fled by -the right to free speech, of which the federal courts have been
very protective. As a result, state courts have generally been able to
maintain only the minimum federal standards, resting their decisions
on the First Amendment, rather than on a similar state provision. In
other areas, such as the regulation of economic affairs, or the prohibi-
tion against double jeopardy, state courts are able to set higher stand-
ards.
Whether the California Declaration of Rights is an independent
or essential guarantee has often been questioned. 2  Yet it is obvious
that it provides a potential source of additional protection in the field
of civil liberties, the content of which is still being developed in the
continual process of adjudication. Nevertheless, the independent, -and
thus higher standards required by the California Declaration of Rights
are by no means guaranteed, being always subject to varying circum-
stances such as changing court personnel. Other commentators have
concluded that draftsmanship alone cannot guarantee protection be-
yond federal minimums.17 3  Certainly it is unrealistic -to presume that
the texts as drafted by the framers over one hundred years ago are
more than one in a complex set of factors determining how individual
rights are protected. It is likewise unsound to accept the premise of
independent state bills of rights and, nevertheless, to hold these docu-
ments meaningless. The Declaration of Rights is an important source
of protection for each individual. Given the present institutional dom-
ination of society, "an individual, who walks in the shadow of the gov-
ernmental monoliths' 174 is entitled to the full utilization of such a
source.
Lawrence M. Newman*
Not only is the thrust of the two courts in different directions, one backing away
from the exclusionary rule, the other strictly adhering to it, but California cases are di-
rectly in conflict with Calandra. In this state, the courts are aided in their application
of the rule in a grand jury situation by the legislature, which has decreed that only com-
petent evidence can be introduced before a grand jury. CAL. PEN. CODE § 939.6 (West
1970). While incompetent evidence will not invalidate an indictment or information
if there is other competent evidence to support it, either an information or indictment
based wholly on hearsay, fruits of an illegal search or seizure, or other incompetent evi-
dence, is unauthorized. People v. Crosby, 58 Cal. 2d 713, 375 P.2d 839, 25 Cal. Rptr.
847 (1962); Rogers v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 3, 291 P.2d 929 (1955).
Despite the similarity of the provisions, California continues its independent ways,
although in the Calandra situation, it is not the California Supreme Court which has
taken radical new steps under the exclusionary rule, but rather the United States Su-
preme Court which is retreating from the stand it once took.
172. See Mazor, supra note 1, at 348; Project Report, supra note 2, at 283.
173. Countryman, supra note 2, at 463.
174. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 147, 481 P.2d 242, 254, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234,
246 (1971).
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